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Abstract 
 
Since 9/11 western and non-western governments have implemented counter-counter terrorism and 
de-radicalisation programs to “inoculate Muslim populations” and de-radicalise those deemed as 
radicalised through securitization and “moderate Islam”. The Indonesian government and civil socie-
ty organizations have attempted to address radicalisation by setting up counter-radicalisation and 
de-radicalisation programs. This paper will critically reflect on the Indonesian de-radicalisation pro-
grams. It will first critically discuss the terms radicalisation and de-radicalisation. Then critically 
assess the Indonesian de-radicalisation programs. In the final section, the author suggests that Indo-
nesia needs to introduce humanitarian activities to make the de-radicalisation programs more effec-
tive and overcome labelling and stigmatization.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism has become a significant 
policy concern for some Southeast Asian 
countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. After the Bali bombings in 
2002, Southeast Asia was viewed by the 
US as the second layer in the global war 
against terrorism (Aslam et al., 2016; Tan, 
2003). Since that proclamation in 2002, 
the terror threat in Southeast Asia has in-
creased exponentially and become multi-
dimensional. Numerous terrorist attacks 
have been carried out in the Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia over the past dec-
ade and a half (Associated Press, 2012; 
Westerman, 2017). Apart from Southeast 
Asia experiencing political violence, ter-
rorism and ethnic violence, over 900 for-
eign fighters from the region had trav-
elled to Syria and Iraq to engage in its on-
going civil war (Chassman, 2016; The 
Soufan Group, 2015). This number does 
not account for the women and children 
who had travelled to Syria and Iraq seek-
ing marriage or a new life (The Soufan 
Group, 2015). Some of these individuals 
are now returning to their respective 
countries and may have acquired extrem-
ist ideas akin to those peddled by extrem-
ist groups such as Al Qaida and ISIS and 
may therefore pose a security threat.  
Returnees from Syria and Iraq in 
some cases pose a danger in their home 
countries, as they may become conduits 
for extremism and even launch attacks on 
home soil (Singh, 2016). The possibility of 
homegrown terrorism has also increased 
(Chan, 2016). The recent suicide bomb-
ings of three churches in Surabaya by a 
family of six who had returned from Syria 
highlights the danger returnees can pose 
to their own countries (BBC, 2018). This 
terror attack also adds another dimension 
to the already multi-dimensional threat of 
terrorism, as it was the first-time suicide 
bombings involved an entire family 
(Jones, 2018). The multi-dimensional 
threat of terrorism is reflected by the re-
cent conflict in Marawi City in Mindanao, 
where local and foreign fighters, some of 
them from the Southeast Asia region who 
had fought in Syria and Iraq seized con-
trol over various parts of the city 
(Habulan et al., 2018).  
As a consequence of local, regional 
and global terrorist threats, Southeast 
Asian governments have introduced sev-
eral counter-terrorism measures in order 
to curb the threat. However, one of the 
critical areas of focus has been the estab-
lishment of de-radicalisation programs in 
Southeast Asia, which are deemed a de-
programming tool. The programs were 
first introduced to address Jemaah Islami-
yah (JI) radicalisation but now cater for 
returnees from Syria, which include men, 
women and families. These initial pro-
grams primarily aimed to remove the rad-
ical ideology from an individual who has 
been deemed to be a radical (Rabasa et al., 
2010). However, over the years these pro-
grams have evolved and now also include 
vocational training and entrepreneurship 
schemes, which are have been established 
by the state and civil society groups.  
Although terrorism is a concern for 
many Southeast Asian countries, this pa-
per will only focus on Indonesia. First it 
will highlight the conceptual issues sur-
rounding the terms ‘radicalisation’ and 
‘de-radicalisation.’ Secondly, it will con-
duct a critical review of the effectiveness 
of de-radicalisation programs in Indone-
sia. Finally, it will suggest an alternative 
model of de-radicalisation, one that in-
volves a humanitarian approach. The cen-
tral thesis of this paper is that de-
radicalisation is not achievable, and the 
current programs in Indonesia are not 
effective for several economic and politi-
cal reasons. The author suggests that if 
the Indonesian programs are to be suc-
cessful, the state and civil society groups 
need to work together to establish long-
term programs that include economic and 
entrepreneurship schemes and humani-
tarian initiatives, because radicalisation is 
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primarily caused by unjust treatment of 
an identifiable and relatable group, such 
as religious or ethnic groups. Such an ap-
proach will more likely convince extrem-
ists to focus on low risk and high impact/
high reward because it addresses their 
core concerns. The author advocates ac-
tivities that focus on humanitarian issues 
and which are aimed to have an immedi-
ate impact on the lives of Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Indonesia, as well as oth-
er countries. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Problematising Radicalisation and De-
Radicalisation 
Although the two definitions of radi-
calisation focus on two ends of the pro-
cess, some academics deem psychological 
radicalisation as more important than 
ideological because of its connection to 
violence (Sageman, 2017). They argue 
that many people may hold extremist or 
radical ideas but very few “act” on them in 
violent ways, and therefore it is more im-
portant to focus on the acting. However, 
others contend that ideology is a precur-
sor to violence and therefore should not 
be ignored (Neuman, 2013).  
However, these definitions are not 
without criticism. Some authors have 
called radicalisation a myth (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2009). Others, like Mark 
Sedgewick (2010), argue that the concept 
of radicalisation over-emphasises ideolo-
gy and de-emphasises the non-ideological 
circumstances that lead one to become 
radicalised. Numerous authors have ar-
gued that non-ideological factors cause 
radicalisation. These factors include, 
amongst many, the foreign policies of 
Western states (the unilateral invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq) under the guise 
of the War on Terror, the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, and support for authoritarian re-
gimes in Arab states (Demant and Graaf, 
2010; El-Said, 2015; Ganor, 2002; Hegg-
hammer and Wagemakers, 2013; Kuhle 
and Lindekilde, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; 
Lutz and Lutz, 2015; Ramakrishna, 2014; 
Sageman, 2014; Schmid, 2013; Sedgewick, 
2010). Other possible motivations for the 
radicalisation process include thrill-
seeking, identity seeking and the desire 
for personal revenge (Schmid, 2013). The 
latter motivations have often been con-
nected to Muslims from Muslim minority 
countries and foreign fighters in Syria and 
Iraq. Kundnani (2014) claims that the 
concept of radicalisation from the outset 
was designed to serve the interests of the 
state. As such, it engenders Islamophobia. 
Schuurman and Taylor (2018) contend 
that critics have deemed radicalisation as 
being subjective, lacking in an agreed def-
inition, linear and deterministic. Silva 
(2018) argues that governments ignore 
critical research in favour of research that 
is in line with their agenda. Nasser-Eddine 
et al. (2011) and Neuman (2013) correct-
ly highlight that radicalisation experts on-
ly agree on the fact that radicalisation is a 
process. 
Despite criticism, governments still 
have to prevent radicalisation, especially 
those that deem themselves to be at risk 
of political or terrorist violence. However, 
deciding on a strategy for how to do this 
will depend on which definition a govern-
ment adopts as this will determine how a 
government decides to prevent radicalisa-
tion and address the concerns posed by 
those believed to have been radicalised or 
engaged in political or terrorist violence.  
How a government understands rad-
icalisation will not only determine its 
strategy to prevent radicalisation but also 
how to “deal with” those that are deemed 
as being radicalised, or who have engaged 
in political or terrorist violence. In the 
case of radicalised Muslims, the goal in 
most Muslim majority and minority coun-
tries is to de-radicalise them by correcting 
their understanding of Islam, and, de-
pending on the country, offer them an op-
portunity to disengage from the group 
and violence through offering life skills 
training or business opportunities (Silke 
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and Veldhuis, 2017). This situation is such 
because these countries deem Islam to be 
the cause of radicalisation, thus almost all 
de-radicalisation programs primarily fo-
cus on countering the radical ideology 
and religious doctrine of “Islamist” terror-
ists (Irwin, 2015). Although de-
radicalisation and disengagement are of-
ten used interchangeably to mean the 
same thing, in reality they are different 
(Schmid, 2013; Horgan, 2008; Pettinger, 
2017). De-radicalisation can be under-
stood as renouncing extremist ideas, 
while disengagement and similar process-
es such as rehabilitation refer to renounc-
ing violence (Silva, 2018). Often govern-
ments develop de-radicalisation pro-
grams by using a mixture of both ap-
proaches, in the hope that de-
radicalisation will lead to disengagement 
(Silke and Veldhuis, 2017; Horgan, 2008; 
Anindya, 2018). However, the reality 
seems to be that disengagement is more 
likely than de-radicalisation (Schmid, 
2013). Perhaps the biggest problem with 
the de-radicalisation programs is that 
they are plagued with a lack of clear em-
pirical criteria to evaluate their success, 
which has in the past led government offi-
cials and de-radicalisation agents to 
grossly exaggerate the success of their 
programs (Koehler, 2017). This could 
partly be due to the overwhelming ideo-
logical focus of programs to de-radicalise 
detainees, which fail to really understand, 
or even ignore, the reasons individuals 
become radicalised and (intend to) en-
gage in violence.   
Regardless of definitional issues, 
what matters is whether the programs 
are successful. In the following section, I 
assess whether the de-radicalisation and 
disengagement programs developed and 
implemented in Indonesia are successful.  
How About Indonesia? 
Although terms like radicalisation 
and de-radicalisation are popular among 
the public, governments, think tanks and 
the media, they mask the definitional 
problems associated with both concepts. 
This then impacts how the public, the 
state, the media and academics under-
stand the phenomena of radicalisation 
and how to address the problem at the 
international, state and local level. Over 
the last few decades, radicalisation has 
been connected to Muslims (Lynch, 2013) 
but this has changed over the past year, 
with more focus on right-wing radicalisa-
tion (BBC, 2019; Butcher; Luxen, 2019). 
In the case of Muslims, radicalisation is 
deemed as being caused by “extremist” 
Islamic teachings (Mazlan et al., 2017; 
Tackling Extremism, 2013). The logical 
consequence of this understanding is that 
the geopolitical security apparatus, the 
state security apparatus, international 
NGOs, and strategies emanating from 
such an understanding, focus on dissemi-
nating a “moderate,” often state-
orientated, understanding of Islam to pre-
vent radicalisation and carry out de-
radicalisation (Rabasa et al., 2004; Mazlan 
et al., 2017). This understanding is then 
superimposed on other possible causes 
for why an individual decided to adopt 
extremist ideas or engage in violence, 
such as local sociopolitical issues and in-
ternational conflicts. The superimposing 
is problematic because it forecloses a nu-
anced understanding of radicalisation, 
which is not based on Islam being the 
conduit for radicalisation.  
Since 9/11 the literature covering 
terrorism has rapidly increased (Neuman, 
2013; Silva, 2018), resulting in many the-
ories and models being developed to pre-
vent and detect radicalised individuals. 
The aim of all of the models, as Neuman 
(2008: 4) notes, is to identify “what goes 
on before the bomb goes off.” However, 
“radicalisation” has many definitions. For 
example, Borum (2011) and Schmid 
(2013) have identified several definitions 
employed by academics and govern-
ments, the two main ways in which radi-
calisation is defined is ideological and 
psychological (Sageman, 2017; Neumann, 
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2013). Ideological radicalisation refers to 
an ideological shift: acquiring extremist 
ideas (i.e. ideas that are opposed to socie-
ty’s values, such as supremacist ideologies 
or ideologies that reject democratic val-
ues and human rights, which alter an indi-
vidual’s behaviour). In the case of Mus-
lims, this is the acquisition of ideas and 
understandings based on a literal inter-
pretation of Islam. Psychological radicali-
sation refers to a further shift: acting on 
the ideas in violent ways. In the case of 
Muslims this means using violence to for-
ward the individual or group cause, such 
Al Qaeda and ISIS or affiliate groups. Alt-
hough these definitions appear to be sep-
arate, a closer reading suggests that they 
are connected because ideological radical-
isation is deemed to lead to psychological 
radicalisation (Neumann, 2013; Sageman, 
2017). These definitions have enabled 
governments to assess whether their 
country faces more risk from ideological 
or psychological radicalisation; the British 
government, for example, has adopted 
both definitions as part of its counter-
terrorism strategy because it sees ideo-
logical radicalisation as leading to psycho-
logical radicalisation (Prevent UK, 2011). 
Despite the distinction between ide-
ological and psychological radicalisation, 
there remains vagueness and difference 
around what constitutes ideological radi-
calisation and what academics and gov-
ernments should focus on to further un-
derstanding and develop policies. The am-
biguity around what constitutes ideologi-
cal radicalisation rests on what count as 
“extremist” or “radical” ideas, which dif-
fers depending on the context (Neumann, 
2013). Hence, what is deemed extremist 
or radical in one context differs from an-
other, resulting in a different configura-
tion of ideas and beliefs that society and 
government deem as “dangerous” and 
constituting radicalisation. Therefore, def-
initions of radicalisation developed in the 
West may not be suitable for Muslim ma-
jority countries because the sociopolitical 
environments and connected values and 
norms are different. Applying such defini-
tions is likely to capture phenomena that 
reflect Western understandings of ex-
tremism and radicalism, rather than 
grasping the reality on the ground in Mus-
lim majority countries.  
In the first decade of the 21st centu-
ry, Indonesia experienced a spate of ter-
rorist acts – namely, the 2002 and 2005 
Bali bombings, the 2003 J.W. Marriott Ho-
tel bombing and the 2005 Australian em-
bassy bombing (Osman, 2014). The per-
petrators of those attacks belonged to the 
notorious terrorist organisation Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI). Since those attacks, the In-
donesian government has detained more 
than 300 JI members. In November 2015, 
the Indonesian government officially stat-
ed that 700 Indonesians had travelled to 
Syria in order to engage in its ongoing civ-
il war (The Soufan Group, 2015). This 
number is an estimate, and the actual 
number could be either higher or lower. 
The Soufan Group (2015) also found that 
at least 162 Indonesians have returned to 
Indonesia, with some of these returnees 
having fought for the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). This number is also an 
estimate because it does not include those 
that have re-entered Indonesia undetect-
ed. This situation indicates that there is a 
prolonged struggle within Indonesia to 
prevent radicalisation.  
De-Radicalisation and Disengagement 
In Indonesia, the government and 
local civil society groups have rolled out 
several programs, which are a mixture of 
de-radicalisation and disengagement ini-
tiatives. The Indonesian government’s 
first program was aimed at JI members 
who had been convicted of terrorism of-
fences and focused more on disengage-
ment. De-radicalization also played a role 
in the program because radicalisation in 
Indonesia is seen to be caused by literal 
understandings of Islam, which is often 
connected to the type of Islam practiced 
Available Online at https://journal.unismuh.ac.id/index.php/otoritas 
Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 10 (1),  April 2020, 48 
Copyright © 2020, Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, ISSN: 2088-3706 (Print), ISSN: 2502-9320 (Online)  
in Saudi Arabia and is contrary to the 
principles of the Pancasila and local Islam. 
However, as mentioned in earlier sec-
tions, such an understanding may over-
look who and how local sociopolitical and 
international conflicts may lead to indi-
viduals acquiring extremist ideas and, in 
some cases, engaging in violence.  
The de-radicalisation of the detain-
ees involved offering them a contextual-
ised reading of Islam and key terms that 
are often employed by extremist groups, 
such as jihad, dar al harb and dar al is-
lam and sharia to persuade them to ad-
here to a moderate version of Islam and 
Pancasila. The program was based in pris-
on and set up by Suryadharma, the head 
of Densus 88 (the police counter-
terrorism team) and continued under his 
successor, Tito Karnavian (Hwang, 2018). 
The approach was dubbed the “soft ap-
proach” because of its humane outlook 
(Rabasa et al., 2010) and centred on 
Densus 88 officers building relationships 
with the detainees (Istiqomah, 2011; 
Sukabdi, 2015). This often resulted in the 
officers praying alongside the detainees 
and shared iftar (break of fast), and in 
some cases facilitated the marriages of 
the detainees and support for their fami-
lies (Abuza, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010; 
Hwang, 2018). In some cases, officers re-
warded compliant detainees with perks 
such as better detention conditions and 
reduced sentences (Osman, 2014). This 
approach was adopted because it was 
deemed that by treating the detainees hu-
manely, they would be more malleable for 
intelligence gathering (Hwang, 2018).   
The de-radicalisation part of the 
program was conducted by former terror-
ists Nasir bin Abas and Ali Imron. Abas is 
a former member of JI and fought in the 
Afghan war against the Soviet Union dur-
ing the 1980s, while Imron was involved 
in the ethnic conflict in Amon during the 
early 2000s (Abuza, 2009; Hwang, 2018). 
Involving former extremists, especially 
those that have had combat experience, is 
deemed vital because they not only have 
credibility but also garner respect among 
the detainees due to their past exploits 
(Hwang, 2018; Abuza, 2009). Former ex-
tremists often leave a more profound im-
pact on detainees than moderate figures 
and can clarify and contextualise specific 
Islamic ideas that are used by extremist 
groups to foster disunity and engender 
violence, such as those mentioned earlier 
(Osman, 2014). Abas and Imron’s involve-
ment in the program did result in some 
success because they managed to con-
vince detainees to renounce violence as a 
means to achieve political goals (Aslam et 
al., 2016).  
For all the success and the humane 
outlook of the program, it was beset with 
problems. Firstly, the program was never 
set up for de-radicalisation. Its primary 
aim was intelligence gathering (Rabasa et 
al., 2010; Hwang, 2018). Secondly, detain-
ees complained about being tortured by 
Densus 88 officers. Thirdly, the program 
was ad hoc and underfunded, which en-
sured that it failed.   
Since the initial program, the Indo-
nesian government and local civil society 
groups have set up other de-radicalisation 
and disengagement programs to cater for 
Indonesians who have been deported 
from various countries for being radical-
ised, having aspirations to join an extrem-
ist or terrorist group, or for fighting in the 
Syrian civil war (Sumpter, 2018). The de-
portees and returnees include men, wom-
en and children (Au, 2019). These individ-
uals are deemed as posing a significant 
security risk because some of them have 
had military training and have frontline 
fighting experience and could carry out 
attacks in Indonesia (Mcbeth, 2019).  
The government’s program lasts for 
one month and involves psychological as-
sessment for the level of radicalisation, 
which is based on using Islam as an indi-
cator; religious re-education (moderate 
Islam); life coaching (counselling and life 
skills); signing a contract to abide by the 
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Pancasila; and after-care (Anindya, 2019). 
Like the previous program, the govern-
ment deems radicalisation as being 
caused by an “incorrect” understanding of 
Islam, which is clear from the indicators 
used by psychologists and the use of 
imams to persuade detainee to adopt a 
moderate understanding of Islam. This 
approach does not appear to be entirely 
successful because some deportees upon 
release still deem the Indonesian govern-
ment as un-Islamic (Anindya, 2019). The 
program also employs “forceful persua-
sion” tactics to convince the deportees to 
sign a contract that states that they will 
abide by the Pancasila (Sumpter, 2019). 
The after-care part of the program is or-
ganised and delivered by local civil socie-
ty groups, which focus on training depor-
tees with life skills and helping them to 
find a sustainable form of employment or 
establish a business (Anindya, 2019). The 
ultimate aim of such programs is to en-
sure that the detainees do not return to 
the old networks and engage in violence. 
However, like the Indonesian gov-
ernment’s first program, the current pro-
gram is beset with similar problems. The-
se problems include the length of the pro-
grams, organisational concerns such as 
lack of resources, disorganisation be-
tween stakeholders, competition between 
stakeholders, lack of training for employ-
ees, use of force and no clear guidelines 
for or understanding of different aspects 
of the program (Anindya, 2019). Finally, 
the program does not address the core 
motivations of the detainees for why they 
became radicalised and engaged in terror-
ism. As mentioned earlier, motivations 
are sociopolitical or connected to interna-
tional conflicts where fellow members of 
an ethnic, national or religious group are 
experiencing injustice at the hands of a 
more powerful other (Agnew, 2010). Such 
motivations are apparent in the cases of 
men and women who are sympathetic to 
or join extremist and terrorist groups like 
ISIS (Borum and Fein, 2017; Agnew, 
2010; Nilsson, 2015; Malet, 2015).    
Aside from the Indonesian govern-
ment’s de-radicalisation programs, there 
are civil society groups that have set up 
programs that mainly focus on disengage-
ment. The civil society groups do not em-
phasise de-radicalisation because there is 
a tacit recognition that de-radicalisation is 
not possible (Osman, 2014). In spite of 
this recognition, the programs do have a 
de-radicalisation component, which could 
be at request of foreign funders or the 
government. he programs are structured 
around three key areas - life skills train-
ing, business entrepreneurship and de-
radicalisation. The program set up by 
Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP) has 
gained a lot of international acclaims and 
media coverage for its approach to disen-
gagement (Power, 2018). The program 
focuses on providing life skills and oppor-
tunities for business ventures for extrem-
ists who have decided to disengage from 
extremist groups and violence. Through 
this approach YPP aim to foster economic 
conditions that are favourable for suc-
cessful disengagement and ultimate re-
nunciation of extremist ideas. The busi-
ness ventures include cafes, restaurants 
and t-shirt printing (Hwang, 2018). Alt-
hough the program does not explicitly fo-
cus on religious re-education, it is intro-
duced during the latter part of the pro-
gram. The success of the program seems 
to rest on three factors – trust/loyalty-
building, assistance with personal matters 
and help to establish a sustainable busi-
ness. However, the program only seems 
to work with those who are “interested” 
in disengagement and those who have al-
ready renounced extremist ideas before 
they enrol on the program. Hence, the ex-
perience of being imprisoned and discov-
ery of ideological differences with other 
extremists (Osman, 2014) may have al-
ready triggered what Muhanna-Matar 
(2017) has called “self-deradicalisation,” 
which is based on self-questioning as part 
of the disengagement process (Hogan, 
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2008). This begs the question of whether 
the success of the program is really due to 
the program or whether the prisoners 
were already disengaged, and the pro-
gram just offers an opportunity to start a 
new life. Silke (2011) argues that most 
terrorists disengage without going 
through a de-radicalisation program be-
cause of their experience of being part of 
a terrorist group. If this is the case for the 
YPP program, then it can be argued that 
the program is less about disengagement 
and more about welfare support, up-
skilling and business entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, like most programs that 
aim to either de-radicalise or disengage 
extremists, there is no “sure way” of 
measure if the individual has “truly been 
de-radicalised or will never re-engage in 
violence” apart from employing the crite-
ria of non-recidivism (Horgan, 2009; Hor-
gan and Braddock, 2010). Additionally, 
abandoning extremist ideas or disengag-
ing from violence may only be selective or 
conditional depending on continued assis-
tance or “no provocative actions” by the 
adversary (Hwang, et al., 2013; Clubb, 
2009; Rasba et al., 2010).   
Other civil society groups working in 
the area of de-radicalisation also employ a 
similar approach to YPP. Search for Com-
mon Ground “conducts workshops in 
prisons on anger management and con-
flict resolution for high and low-risk de-
tainees” (Osman, 2014: 224; Hwang, 
2018). The organisation offers seed mon-
ey to encourage detainees to disengage 
and has a dual aim. The first is to prevent 
the detainees from re-joining their former 
groups and, secondly, to train the detain-
ees in conflict resolution, so that they can 
implement the training in their own lives 
and train others (Hwang, 2018). However, 
the program only attracts low risk and 
less dangerous detainees, rather than the 
high-risk ones. The program can be un-
derstood as both a success and a failure. It 
is a success because it has diverted low-
risk detainees from “possibly” engaging in 
violence in the future and provided them 
with tools to negotiate their way out of 
conflicts. It is unsuccessful because high-
risk detainees who could influence low-
risk detainees and others post-release 
have not shown any interest. Other initia-
tives have included coaching the wives of 
the detainees to be self-sufficient through 
the establishment of home-based busi-
nesses (Osman, 2014). Such a program is 
likely to make the detainees more mallea-
ble to cooperate with authorities and dis-
engage from using violence.  
Labelling and Stigmatisation 
Civil society groups in Indonesia 
have highlighted that labels such as coun-
tering violent extremism and de-
radicalisation are unhelpful and counter-
productive (Sumpter, 2017) because they 
engender a range of consequences for the 
government, civil society groups and the 
detainees (during detention and post re-
lease). This situation is especially the case 
if the detainees perceive the program to 
be politically motivated or if they con-
clude that the aim is to undermine their 
religiosity (Sukabdi, 2015; Sumpter, 
2017). A label could have positive or neg-
ative connotations depending on what 
action the label is trying to capture, who 
is doing the labelling, and the location 
(neighbourhood, city or country). In crim-
inology, labelling theory provides an ex-
planation for how being labelled, for ex-
ample, a “criminal” or “terrorist” is expe-
rienced or lived out by the labelled 
(Appleby, 2010). In some cases, being la-
belled negatively can result in being treat-
ed by wider society, the media and gov-
ernment institutions in ways that engen-
der stigmatisation, which in turn can fos-
ter othering - insider v outsider (Cherney 
and Murphy, 2017). Experiencing stigma-
tisation can result in the stigmatised com-
munity or individual feeling resentful and 
unwilling to co-operate with the authori-
ties (Tyler et al., 2010).  
The continuing use of labels 
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“terrorist” or “former terrorist” to de-
scribe detainees by the state, the media 
and Indonesian society, even after they 
have undergone de-radicalisation or dis-
engagement, is likely to lead to stigmati-
sation and obstacles to reintegrating the 
detainees. The detainees may view the 
government with disdain and see it as non
-Muslim. Such labels are also likely to al-
ienate the detainees from their own or 
other communities (even those who are 
willing to co-operate with the state and 
civil society groups). Additionally, the la-
belling is likely to hinder the reintegra-
tion process because of how the commu-
nity sees and relates to the detainees and 
their families.  
The impact of labelling does not re-
main in the prison. The families of the de-
tainees also face stigmatisation from their 
communities, which could push them to 
extremism. Stigmatisation from society in 
general, and specifically from communi-
ties that the detainees originate from, is a 
significant obstacle that can hinder the 
reintegration of former detainees. This 
occurs because local media is often in-
formed about the return of the detainee, 
which can result in the detainees moving 
around to find a community that will ac-
cept them (Anindya, 2019). In some in-
stances, the stigmatisation of former de-
tainees is fuelled by intelligence agencies 
that give warnings to the neighbours of 
former detainees about their potential 
threat (Sumpter, 2017). Former detainees 
have stated that reintegration and re-
duced stigmatisation are two essential 
criteria for what constitutes a successful 
rehabilitation (Sukabdi, 2015). The broad 
stigmatisation of these former detainees 
can severely nullify the social and voca-
tional skills that developed during their 
detention. Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
businesses that these former detainees 
started would be successful if the larger 
Indonesian society and the local commu-
nity continue to view them with suspi-
cion. The usefulness of any skill that is de-
veloped during their detention is predi-
cated on the larger Indonesian society 
trusting them post-release. The absence 
of trust and the existence of broad stigma-
tisation will inevitably hinder any reinte-
gration effort. 
The Role of Humanitarianism  
One way to overcome the problems 
associated with labelling and stigmatisa-
tion, and to promote trust between the 
detainees and former detainees, the Indo-
nesian government and Indonesian socie-
ty in general, is to involve the detainees in 
humanitarian work.  
 The literature on radicalisation has 
shown that one of the pull factors that at-
tracts individuals to extremist groups is 
their lack of belonging and sense of griev-
ance (Schmid, 2013). The desire to belong 
to a group has also led to individuals trav-
elling abroad to join extremist groups that 
are involved in civil wars (Mustapha, 
2013). Besides this, another pull factor for 
individuals joining extremist or terrorist 
groups is to help their Muslim brethren 
whom they believe are experiencing vio-
lence at the hands of a more powerful 
other (Schmid, 2013). Such factors engen-
der a feeling of “personal 
quest” (Kruglanski, 2014), which is con-
nected to and emerges out of the relation-
ship that an individual has with a commu-
nity experiencing suffering at the hands of 
the other that he or she can identify with 
along religious, ethnic or political regis-
ters. Under the aforementioned condi-
tions, personal quest becomes indistin-
guishable from the group quest, especially 
is it framed around the vernacular of the 
umma discourse. In the case of Muslims 
this could be identification with Iraqi 
Muslims (Sunni or Shia, depending on 
which interpretation the individual fol-
lows) because of the invasion of Iraq by 
the US and its allies, or the Israeli violence 
towards the Palestinians. This desire to 
help fellow Muslims that are suffering is 
evidenced by foreign fighters who trav-
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elled to war zones in Chechnya, Bosnia, 
Afghanistan and Syria (Mustapha, 2013; 
Nilsson, 2016).  
It can be argued that the motivation 
for those individuals who travel to active 
conflict zones in Chechnya, Bosnia and 
Afghanistan is humanitarian and altruis-
tic. For example, many Muslims from dif-
ferent states had initially travelled to Bos-
nia to provide humanitarian aid amidst 
the attempted genocide and massacre of 
Bosnian Muslims (Nilsson, 2015). In the 
wake of experiencing these atrocities first
-hand, some of these aid workers eventu-
ally joined groups to engage in the civil 
war (Nilsson, 2015). They saw their in-
volvement in the group as a form of de-
fensive jihad that would help protect their 
Muslim brethren (Malet, 2015). Conse-
quently, the most effective way to pro-
mote de-radicalisation is to develop pro-
grams that would address the motivations 
of the aforementioned type of individuals 
centred around humanitarianism, rather 
than those based on securitization, inte-
gration initiatives, notions of moderate 
Islam, sporting activities or other commu-
nity cohesion initiatives that do not target 
the motivations, cost a lot and in many 
cases have low impact. 
However, the decision-making calcu-
lus behind joining the ranks of extremist 
and terrorist groups can be considered to 
be high risk, low impact and low reward. 
Joining an extremist or terrorist group or 
participating in an active conflict zone 
puts an individual’s life at significant risk 
and will likely not yield the impact and 
reward they desire because there is an 
increased likelihood of them being arrest-
ed or killed before having any impact on 
the conflict. Herein lies the potential value 
of incorporating humanitarian work with-
in de-radicalisation and disengagement 
programs.  
Programs based around humanitari-
an work can be incorporated into existing 
or new de-radicalisation or disengage-
ment programs. Such work can be cloaked 
by using the language of Islam and human 
rights. For example, reinterpreting terms 
like jihad and using Quranic verses like 
“whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved 
mankind entirely” could be used as the ba-
sis to develop programs that include hu-
manitarian work. Such programs would 
be high-impact in terms of the effective-
ness and be low risk because they would 
be legal. High-impact because the motiva-
tions of the detainees and former detain-
ees for joining extremist or terrorist 
groups are being addressed, and they can 
see how their efforts are changing the 
lives of Muslims and non-Muslims. Such 
programs could also be an effective way 
to persuade detainees and former detain-
ees to renounce extremist ideas because 
the exposure to such humanitarian work 
could challenge the group and state un-
derstanding of and solutions to conflicts.  
Civil society groups in Indonesia, re-
gardless of whether they are involved in 
de-radicalisation or disengagement or 
both, can develop programs that incorpo-
rate humanitarian work, which would 
mean developing programs that directly 
address the humanitarian aspect of the 
detainee’s motivations to join extremist 
or terrorist groups like ISIS. Such pro-
grams could be developed in such a way 
that the detainees and former detainees 
would help Indonesians or fellow Mus-
lims in different parts of the world that 
are experiencing strain. Examples of hu-
manitarian work could include charity 
work involving disaster relief, conserva-
tion (cultural and environmental), devel-
opment and fundraising for disease re-
search. However, such work must also 
include extensive risk analysis and de-
tainees and former detainees must under-
go regular evaluations to assess their re-
habilitation. Additionally, the exposure 
that humanitarian work would bring 
would also help dilute the broad stigmati-
sation that detainees face post-release. 
The possible dilution of the stigmatisation 
would help to strengthen their sense of 
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acceptance by the community and belong-
ing in Indonesia.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has highlighted some of 
the problems that have beset the Indone-
sian government’s and civil society 
groups’ attempts to de-radicalise and dis-
engage detainees during their time in de-
tention and post-release.  
Although the de-radicalisation and 
disengagement programs in Indonesia 
have had some success, they have been 
beset with problems. These problems can 
be alleviated by taking the following 
measures: 1. The Indonesian government 
sufficiently funding its own programs, and 
those developed by civil society groups; 2. 
Indonesian civil society groups tend to 
rely on foreign donors, which could be 
counter-productive because some radical-
ised individuals blame donors for vio-
lence against Muslims (western countries 
and their allies); 3.   The Indonesian gov-
ernment sufficiently funding after-care 
programs; 4. After-care programs being 
diverse and, as mentioned earlier, also 
inclusive of humanitarian work; 5. Estab-
lishment of a central organisation to coor-
dinate all de-radicalisation and disen-
gagement programs (staffed with govern-
ment officials and members of civil socie-
ty groups); 6. Increasing the duration of 
the de-radicalisation and disengagement 
programs because renouncing extremist 
ideas and disengaging from extremist 
groups can take a long time; 7. Develop-
ment and implementation tools to moni-
tor the success of programs and develop 
ways to reduce the stigmatisation experi-
enced by detainees during their detention 
and post-release. This obstacle can be 
overcome by educating the security ser-
vices, the public and the media about the 
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